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NOTES
"THE FIRST WORDS IN A DEED AND THE LAST
IN A WILL PREVAIL"
or
"TESTAMENTARY REVOCATION BY INCONSISTENCY
WITHIN THE INSTRUMENT"
From the time of Lord Coke' the maxim has had wide circulation that the first words in a deed and the last words in a will
prevail where they are repugnant to each other. No modern
court has indicated in its opinion that this is based upon reason
and (in most cases) the maxim has been unreflectingly repeated.
Where the provisions of a will conflict inter se so that the thing
given to A is by a later clause given to B, there are, of course,
three alternatives: (1) The last declaration prevails; (2) the
legatees take jointly or in common; (3) the resulting uncertainty
leaves the subject matter undisposed of and there is a failure of
the gift. The fourth alternative that the first clause should prevail is suggested in a Kentucky case, and the first clause
2
prevailed.
(a) Revocation. When it is stated that in a will the last
words prevail, it is not clear whether the writer intends this as a
matter of construction, or a rule of law or whether he means that
there is a revocation. Surely this cannot amount to a revocation.
It is absurd to assume that a man writes a will or a portion of it
and then intentionally revokes the act while in the doing, as if a
testator should say, "I hereby devise Blackacre to A. I revoke
that devise and give it instead to B." A will may be revoked by
(a) certain circumstances; (b) by burning, tearing, canceling
1
Coke on Littleton, 112b. Coke, commenting on "divers testaments" and "divers devises," terms used by Littleton, said under the
former, "The first grant and the last will is of greatest force." This
recognizes the ambulatory character of a will contrasted with a grant.

Under the latter he said:

".

. . Also that in one will when there be

divers devises of one thing the last devise taketh place."

This is, of

course, a misinterpretation of Littleton.
2
atkins v. Bennett, 170 Ky. 464, 186 S. W. 182 (1916) ("The very

order In which one writes is most frequently indicative of his
intention").

46
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or obliterating; or (c) by later writing in the proper form. The
statute does not contemplate revocation by writing as such within
the instrument. Any writing within the will operative as a revocation takes the form of cancellation or obliteration, i.e., an act to
the document other than a writing. A will consisting of a single
instrument is an integer and the courts will construe its conflicting parts and give effect to all of them so far as it is possible
to do so.3 In a deed, on the other hand, it is said that the first
words prevail and there is no revocation unless it is possible that
the earlier words revoke the later words. Even in a will a fee
estate or an absolute interest once devised will not be cut down by
doubtful subsequent expressions. 4 If, then, the last words
prevail, it should be a matter of construction rather than of
revocation. 5
The theory that a later expression may revoke a former one
Day v. Wallace, 144 Ill. 256, 33 N. E. 185 (1893); Heidelbaugh v.
Wagner, 72 Iowa 601, 34 X. W. 439 (1887); re Freeman's Estate, 148
Iowa 38, 124 N. W. 804 (1910); Windt's Estate, 110 Pa. Sup. 124, 167
A. 467 (1933); re Fisher, 19 R. I. 53, 31 A. 579 (1895).
'Griffin v. Pringle, 56 Ala. 486 (1876) (The residuary clause was
put early in the will but was given same effect as if it had appeared
last); Hays v. Martz, 173 Ind. 279, 288, 89 N. E. 303, 90 N. E. 309 (1909)
(Fee cut down here by later clause); Curry v. Curry, 105 N. E. 951
(Ind. App. 1914) (Court discusses the general rules of construction);
Rona v. Meier, 47 Iowa 607 (1878) (Gift over after an absolute interest
fails). Cf. Porter v. Union Trust Co., 182 Ind. 637, 108 N. E. 117
(1915); Bradford v. Martin, 199 Iowa 250, 201 N. W. 574 (1925)
(Similar): ("Where the gift to the first taker is absolute the estate Is
exhausted and nothing remains of which disposition may be made");
Utley v. Roark, 3 Ky. Op. 391 (1869); Martin v. Palmer, 193 Ky. 25, 234
S. W. 742 (1921) (Gift over of remainder after a fee is void); Paster
v. Catlett, 260 Ky.. 826, 86 S. W. (2d) 1028 (1935) (same); Davis v.
Bogg, 20 Ohio St. 550, 565 (1870) (Gift in trust and no beneficiaries
named, constituting an effort to give an absolute interest with remainder
over). Cf. Smith v. Bell, 31 U. S. 68 (6 Pet. 1832) (Fee cut down), and
Lightfoot v. Beard, 230 Ky. 488, 29 S. W. (2d) 90 (1929) (same). See
Utley v. Roark, 3 Ky. Op. 391 (1869).
1 Being similar in effect to a revocation, such a construction is frequently called a revocation: Ridout v. Pain, 3 Atk. 486, 493 (Ch. 1747)
("Suppose a man gives a farm in Dale to A in one part of his will and
in another to B, it has been held in the old books to be a revocation");
Paramour v. Yardley, 2 Plow. 539, 541 (K. B. 1579); Sims v. Doughty,
5 Ves. 243 (Ch. 1800); Kerr v. Clinton, L. R. 8 Eq. Cas. 462 (1869) (Rule
not applied where second gift is by implication); Estate of Burdin, 282
Ill. App. 511 (1935) (Court failed to reconcile the provisions, which
might well have been done here); Covert v. Seburn, 73 Iowa 564, 35
N. W. 636 (1887) (Alleged conflicting residuary clauses); Rowland v.
Miller, 81 Fla. 408, 88 So. 263 (1921) (Repugnancy in the same clause);
Hollins v. Coonan, 9 Gill. 62 (Mid. 1850).

NoTEs
puts on a par (a) a revocation by later will or codicil with (b)
an inconsistent provision in the later clause or paragraph and
(c) a repugnancy in the very same clause.7 In (b) and (c) there
is a question whether there is any significance in the order and
whether the same result should not be reached whatever the order
of words.
Surely no one will argue that the last words of a selfcontradictory clause are to be given additional weight simply
because of their position. In much the same way there is no
sufficient reason to say that contradictory words in a later clause
are better. The will being a whole, the conflict is rather one of
inadvertence than of intent. The purpose of a codicil, however,
is to modify, add to or confirm a will and there is no difficulty in
finding that where it contradicts the will, the testator has experienced a change of purpose. The fact that a codicil is to be construed as a part of the will does not eliminate the truth that it
is later in time. But the entire language of a single instrument
speaks as of the same time, one part with another.
(b) Constrzictions. That the problem is one of construction
seems evident by the fact that not infrequently the first words
are given effect. This is true not merely when the courts refuse
to cut down a fee or absolute interest by subsequent doubtful
expressions or gifts over of the remainder but also where the
subsequent inconsistent gift is one by implication.8 So a partic6 In Wells v. Fuchs, 226 Mo. 87, 104, 125 S. W. 1137, 1139 (1910) it is
declared that a codicil is to be interpreted the same as if it were in
subsequent clause in the same will. See also Kemp v. Hutchinson, 110
S. W. (2d) 1126 (Mo. App. 1937).
7 Leicester v. Biggs, 2 Taunt. 109 (C. P. 1809) (Devise to trustees in
trust to pay unto or else permit or suffer T's niece to receive the rents.
"To pay" makes the trust active, but "to suffer or permit" makes it
passive, hence the niece took a legal and not an equitable fee); Morrall
v. Sutton, I Phil. 533, 537 (Ch. 1845) (Gift to A, her administrators,
executors, and assigns during the term of her natural life. She takes
a life estate); Luitjens v. Larson, 222 Iowa 1320, 271 N. W. 239 (1937)
(Residue to wife for and during the term of her natural life in fee
simple. She takes the property absolutely); Morgan v. Meacham, 279
Ky. -, 130 S. W. (2d) 992 ("To be his absolutely for his lifetime").
"Kerr v. Clinton, L. R. 8 Eq. Cas. 462 (1869) (T gave the surplus
after payment of his debts and funeral expenses to his wife. There
were two mortgages on his lands which were not created by himself
and so were not his debts. By later clause he devised the lands to his
sons and directed his trustees to raise out of his real property such
sums as should be necessary to pay his debts, funeral expenses, and
mortgages, which his personal estate should not suffice to pay. This
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ular gift will not be affected by an inconsistent subsequent
general gift.9 When one considers the very infinite variety of
irregularities of testamentary expression, it is not surprising
that this type of irregularity should occur occasionaly. In addition to the case where the same property once given to A is
subsequently given to B, there are three situations where later
words conflict with prior expressions:
1. The gift is to A and is followed by a clause cutting down
or enlarging or repeating A's interest.1 0 Such a modification or
tautology is not infrequent in wills. Niany of the cases where it
is held that words of doubtful import will not cut down a fee
once given are of this type."
2. The repugnancy does not affect the particular interests
of any beneficiaries so as to cause a conflict of interests as in the
case where the inconsistency involves management and method
of disposition of the estate. 12 In Armstrong v. Crapo,13 however,
the court was led astray by the maxim that the last words prevail
and treated the matter as one of revocation rather than one of
construction. The testator had given plaintiff an annuity for life
explicitly. In a later clause he directed that final distribution
should be made after ten years. Thus, the court awarded to
plaintiff an annuity for ten years only, which could not have been
the testator's intent.
was held to be an implied gift to his sons of the sums necessary to pay
off the mortgages and the gift to the wife was not disturbed). In Hunt
v. Johnson, 49 Ky. 342 (10 B. Mon. 1850) and Watkins v. Bennett, 170
Ky. 464, 186 S. W. 182 (1916) the first clause prevailed by construction.
9 Young v. M'Intire, 3 Ohio 498, 502 (1828) ("All my personal property to A, all my stocks to B." This is the converse of the rule stated).
' Sternberg v. Florida Nat. Bank, 114 Fla. 580, 154 So. 844 (1934)
(First clause gave to A the residue of the personalty. The later clause
gave A the residue of all his property, real, personal and mixed in
trust. He left nothing save personal property and it was held not subject to the trust. Rowland v. Mfiller, 81 Fla. 408, 88 So. 263 (1921)
(T devised to A a certain lot. In the next sentence he declared that it
was to be held in trust for A. The court's analysis that this latter
declaration was a revocation seems untenable. T had not yet completed the terms of the devise); re Buechley's Estate, 283 Pa. 107, 128
A. 730 (1925) (T, in the same paragraph, gave (a) "all the remainder
of my estate to my son William" . . . "Item. I will all my property,
real estate, to my son William." It was argued by the other heirs
that the last revoked the first provision, but it was held merely that a
portion was given twice). Cf. Mayo v. Cooksey, 149 Ky. 43, 145 S. W.
1135 (1912).
u Cf. cases in note 3.
1Cf. Hendershot v. Shields, 42 N. J. Eq. 317, 3 Atl. 355 (1886).
"72 Iowa 604, 34 N. W. 437 (1887).
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3. There may be two residuary clauses in the same will,
one favoring A, the other B. Generally the second clause receives
only that which falls out of the first,' 4 and there should be no
room for the application of the "last words" rule. It is possible
that circumstances such as relationship as well as the presence
or absence of other provisions, may give rise to a different
inference.' 5 This being an ambiguity, evidence should be
admitted to show the real intent if it is available. 16
In England some time after Coke, a strong line of authority
developed which held that the beneficiaries took as joint tenants
or possibly as tenants in common. Such a construction was said
to be equitable.' 7 Equality is equity and it avoids intestacy
caused by uncertainty. Apart from the matter of double residuary clauses, the weight of authority in this country is that the
first words are revoked in case the same gift is made successively
to two beneficiaries.'6 This is a tribute to the great influence of
" Wheeler v. Brewster, 68 Conn. 177, 36 Ati. 32 (1896); Lewin v.
Lewin, 2 Ves. Sr. 415 (Ch. 1752). And Cf. Heidlebaugh v. Wagner,
72 Iowa 601, 34 N. W,. 439 (1887).
15Covert v. Seburn, 73 Iowa 564, 35 N. W. 636 (1887) (Earlier clause
gives residue to T's brothers and sisters, later clause gives residue to
dearly beloved adopted son. The latter prevails). Fane v. Fane, 1
Vern. 30 (Ch. 1681) (Residue given to executors in earlier clause, later
they were given $100 for their trouble. In a still later clause residue
was given to the children of F. This clause prevails because of the
uncertainty arising out of the two provisions for the executors). In
Sternberg v. Florida National Bank, 114 Fla- 580, 154 So. 844 (1934)
are two residuary clauses favoring the same beneficiary.
1 See Evans, Irregularitiesof Testamzentary Expression (1939) 27
Ky. L. J. 241, 244-247, on latent and patent ambiguities and admissibility
of external evidence.
' T Ridout v. Pain, 3 Atk. 486, 493 (Ch. 1747) ("It has been held in
the old books (Coke, Rolle, Owen, Swinburne, Godolphin) to be a
revocation but latterly construed either a joint tenancy or a tenancy
in common"); Paramour v. Yardley, 2 Plow. 539, 541 (K. B. 1579);
3 Leon. 11 (C. P. 1566); Bamford v. Bamford, 9 Bulst. 98, 105 (K. B.
1671) (Regarded as a matter of true construction to give effect to the
whole); same case in 1 Rolle 318, 320 (K. B. 1616) ; Mrs. Chamberlain's
Case, Lane 117, 118 (Exch. 1611); Wallop v. Darby, Yel. 209, 210 (K. B.
1612); Anon. Cr. Eliz. 9 (K. B. 1582); Tey's Case, Jenk. 256 (Exch.
1592); Atcherley v. Vernon, 10 Mod. 518, 522 (K. B. 1724). However,
in Fane v. Fane, 1 Vern. 30 (Ch. 1681) (Conflicting residuary clauses)
the general rule is stated; and in Sherratt v. Bentley, 2 M. & K. 149
(Ch. 1834) Coke's rule is approved.
2 So held in Rowland v. Miller, $1 Fla. 408, 88 So. 263 (1921);
Estate of Burdin, 283 Ill. App. 511 (1935); Fraser v. Boone, 1 Hill Eq.
360 (S. C. 1833) and dicta to same effect in Griffin v. Pringle, 56 Ala.
486 (1876); Olphant v. Pumphrey, 193 Ind. 656, 141 N. E. 517 (1923);
Johnson v. Mayne, 4 Iowa 180, 193 (1856); Heidlebaugh v. Wagner, 72
Iowa 601, 34 N. W. 439 (1887); re Freeman's Estate, 146 Iowa 38, 124
N. W. 804 (1910); Hollins v. Coonan, 9 Gill. 62 (Md. 1850); Hendershot
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Coke and to the fact that his institutes and commentaries were
available for study. Some American cases follow the other
tradition of joint tenancy.19
No case has been found by this writer where the conflicting
gifts were held to create an unsurmountable ambiguity, although
in Boone v. Fraser20 the court states that this is the reasonable
result. The potent influence of Lord Coke led the court to the
other determination. It is believed that where there is no basis
for a construction favoring either the earlier or the later beneficiary, a failure of the gift is the only appropriate result.
Whxere an unresolvable uncertainty appears on the face of the
will (sometimes called a patent ambiguity) the judge must surely
say that he does not know the intent of the testator. In appropriate situations extrinsic evidence may be admitted.
That part of the rule formalized by Lord Coke, that the first
words in a deed of conveyance prevail is not without merit. The
early deed did not require a signature. As soon as it was sealed
and delivered it was binding as a conveyance. It became effective in the order in which it was written, not because that order
was in itself an indication of the intent of the grantor, for intent
was comparatively unimportant. It was only when the law grew
away from formalism and equitable considerations were introduced that the intent of the grantor became significant. But the
order of expression had become important because a grant once
made could not be unmade. This latter rule lingered long after
the canon of interpretation according to the intent had been
v. Shields, 42 N. J. Eq. 317, 3 AtI. 355 (1886); Sheetz's Appeal, 82 Pa.
213 (1876); re Mayer's Estate, 289 Pa. 407, 410, 137 Atl. 627 (1927);
Windt's Estate, 110 Pa. Sup. 124, 167 Atl. 467 (1933). In Kentucky the
rule has often been stated but probably never applied, Hunt v. Johnson,
49 Ky. 342 (10 B. M. 1850); Nelson v. Nelson, 10 Ky. Op. 937 (1880);
Watkins v. Bennett, 170 Ky. 464, 186 S. W. 182 (1916); Shawler v.
Hart, 205 Ky. 93, 268 S. W. 485 (1924).
" Freilinghausen v. New York Life Insurance Company, 31 R. I.
150, 77 Atl. 98 (1910) (Apparently a dictum only). See also Day v.
Wallace, 144 Ill. 256, 33 N. E. 185 (1893). Whitlock v. Wardlaw, 7 Rich.
L. 453 (S. C. 1854)) (Instruction to the jury by the trial judge that if a
slave were twice given in a will it did not invalidate it and the legatee
might take as joint tenants sustained). But see Fraser v. Boone, 1 Hills
Eq. 360 (S. C. 1833) (Lower court holding that they took as joint tenants overruled because of the influence of Lord Coke). North Carolina
Holds that they take as joint tenants. See Field v. Eaton, 16 N. C. 283
(1 Dev. Eq. 1829); McGuire v. Evans, 40 N. C. 269, 273 (5 Ired. Eq.
1848).
0 Supra, n. 17. In Carter v. Kinstead, Owen 84, 85 (C. B. 1592)
Periam, J., was of the opinion that both gifts were void.
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adopted. Tlxere is a reason that such should be the ease. If in
a deed the question of the identity of the grantee is raised, one
being named in the premises and a different one named in the
habendum clause, the first will be interpreted as the proper
grantee because the premises contain the names of the parties to
the deed. Hence the fact that a different person is named in the
liabendum would be disregarded as a matter of construction as
well as a matter of law. In fact, the habendum has come to be
regarded as unnecessary and largely superfluous. 21 The conflict
as to identity of grantee is comparatively rare,22 the most common repugnancy arising where an attempt is made to cut down
an earlier fee or absolute interest by the gift over of a
23
remainder.
In the case of wills, moreover, the formalization of Lord
Coke might well have been accepted as appropriate for his time.
Unlike a deed, no further formalities were required for a will
until under the Statute of Frauds it was required to be signed.
Thus, it was effective as a draft will as it was written. Any subsequent alterations would be in the nature of revocations and
thus the last words would prevail. When, however, the Statute
of Frauds became effective, there could no longer be any basis
for a distinction between wills and deeds. The signing of a
will, was the exact equivalent of sealing and delivery of a deed
and a will, instead of consisting of parts, became an integer.
Though the old formalism still lingers and it is constantly being
repeated that the last words prevail, this is merely an historical
survival. There is no room for it after the adoption of the precept that the intent should prevail. There is no division of a will
into parts corresponding to the premises and habendum of a
deed, and no intrinsic reason why one part of a will should prevail over another part save as it appears more clearly to express
the testator's intent. There is now no more room for the theory of
Tiedeman, infra note 23, ibid.

See Hafner v. Irwin, 20 N. C. 433, Reprint, p. 570 (4 D. &B. 1839)

(Grantor bargains and sells to A H to have and to hold unto the
M. W. C. Clear case of mistake); Blackwell v. Blackwell, 124 N. C.
269, 32 S. E. 676 (1399) (similar).
I Wilkins v. Norman, 139 N. C. 40, 51 S. E. 797 (1905) (Later clause
granting a remainder over does not cut down a previous fee. But see,
e. g., McWilliams v. Ramsey, 23 Ala. 813 (1853), where an absolute gift
was cut down by a later clause. Tiffany says such a rule is of doubtful
utility, 2 Tiffany on Real Property (Enlarged ed. 1920), p. 1619. See
2 Devlin on Deeds (3d. ed. 1911) secs. 838c, 843a; Tiedeman on Real
Property (3rd. ed. 1906) sec. 609.
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revocation within the single testamentary instrument than there
2 4
is for such a theory in a deed or other writing. Blackstone,
evidently puzzled by this contrast between deeds and wills, said
simply that the first words in a deed and the last in a will prevail because they are more avaslable. The writer of a note to
Aspinwall v. Andus 25 seems to agree in part with the explanation
suggested above. He argues that the statute of wills required no
signature and therefore each clause operated from the moment
it was written. We may infer that he means that a repugnant
later clause is revocatory. He further says that where there are
"contraries" in the several parts of a deed the first part shall
stand, and the last part in a will shall stand, but that the maxim
has been continued after the foundation has failed.
One concludes that the rule as to deeds still prevails because
the first words are found in the premises and are construed to
express the true intent. But in the case of wills, if the clauses
cannot be construed or explained so as to avoid a square conflict,
such repugnancy must cause the will or that portion of it to fail.
This is another example of irregularity of testamentary expression which Bacon might well have termed a patent ambiguity.
Equity does not reform wills. If it is imipossible to determine
what testator means by construction or by extrinsic evidence
where that is available, all the analogies point to the failure of
the testamentary purpose. In the great majority of states the
matter is as yet unsettled by judicial decision and the courts are
free to take the view here suggested.
ALvn E. EvANs

"Note 2, Blackstone's Commentaries 379, 381 (Sharswood's
Edition, 1872).
See note b, 7 Man. & G. 912, 922, 135 Eng. Rep. 370, 374 (C. P.
1844).

